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“All the news just repeats itself,” runs a line in John Prine’s song 
“Hello in There.” Read Toronto’s newspapers, and you’ll find 
that the city loses its innocence roughly every five years. Read 
Canadian history books or – if you have a strong enough con-
stitution – watch Canadian history on television, and you’ll find 
that Canada was “made” over and over again. Canada was made 
on September 13th 1759, when the impeccably dressed General 
James Wolfe scaled L’Anse au Foulon (with a little help from his 
friends) and secured Canada for the British Empire. No, scratch 
that. Stephen Harper assured us that it was made during the War 
of 1812. Or, if you’re John Ralston Saul, it was made by the Lafon-
taine-Baldwin alliance and responsible government in 1848. Not 
so, says Richard Gwyn; Sir John A Macdonald was “the man who 
made us.” Roll over, Sir John; Justin Trudeau told us earlier this 
month that Canada was born at Vimy Ridge. Wrong again; we 
also read that Tommy Douglas and Medicare gave Canada its 
distinct identity. The country has had more remakes than Star 
Trek.
So it goes with the marketing of Canadian history – the eleva-
tion of important events into defining moments. All this pales 
in comparison, though, to the World O’Celts, where ethnofilio-
pietism runs amuck. Here, we have books such as How the Scots 
Invented the Modern World and, more modestly, How the Scots 
Invented Canada. Not to be outdone, the Irish have put in a claim 
for the Hibernian basis of all civilization, which they apparently 
saved during the Dark Ages.
What happens when Canadian historical boosterism meets Irish 
historical hyperbole? Why, this: Canadian Confederation may 
have made Canada, but the Fenian raids made Canadian Con-
federation. Ergo, the Fenian raids made Canada. Little did the 
Fenians who gathered by the New Brunswick border in April 
1866 realize the true significance of their action: “Thanks to the 
intervention of the Fenians,” asserted Robert Dallison, “New 
Brunswick was firmly set on the path to Confederation. With-
out New Brunswick, there would have been no Confederation, 
and without Confederation there could be no modern Can-
ada. Canada is real legacy of the Fenian crisis of 1866.” Q.E.D. 
Writing about the Fenian incursion into the Niagara peninsula 
and the subsequent battle of Ridgeway in June 1866, Gearoid O 
hAllmhurain, the Johnson Chair in Quebec and Canadian Irish 
History at Concordia University, described it – without a shred 
of supporting evidence – as “the Irish invasion that changed 
Canada forever.” And in an otherwise fine book on the battle, 
Peter Vronsky assured us that Ridgeway was “Canada’s Bunker 
Hill, down to its subtext of national identity flowering in battle-
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field defeat, tempered by a common resilience to fight another 
day – to never surrender. When Canada was being made, Ridge-
way was the battle that made Canada.” Take that, Justin Trudeau.
***
I’m sitting at a bar in downtown Toronto, with the New Bruns-
wick historian Peter Toner on my left, and Donald Creighton on 
my right. Toner has an Irish Catholic background; his people 
came from County Derry, and there were Fenians in the fam-
ily. Creighton has an Irish Protestant background; his ancestors 
were Presbyterians from Tamlaght O’Crilly parish in County 
Derry. Both are gifted historians; both reflect ethnic values, 
assumptions and attitudes that have persisted through several 
generations and across three thousand miles of ocean. Toner is 
drinking whiskey. Creighton is drinking gin, rye and vermouth 
cocktails. Between sips, he is mocking the Fenians and their inva-
sion plans. “Nothing,” he says, or rather pronounces, “nothing 
could have been more characteristically ‘Irish’ in the broadest, 
most farcical meaning of the word than the conception and 
execution of this great enterprise. With one or two significant 
exceptions, the leaders of the Fenian movement against British 
America were a crew of grandiloquent clowns and vainglorious 
incompetents.” Toner bristles, downs his glass of whiskey, and 
gives him chapter and verse on what the Fenians were about 
– trying to employ Irish Civil War veterans against the British 
Empire, seeking revenge for the Famine, believing they had the 
tacit support of the American government, hoping to trigger 
an Anglo-American war that would provide Fenians in Ireland 
with an opening for revolution. Toner is winning this one. The 
mood is darkening. Their grandparents could have been having 
the same argument.
Then Toner turns to the New Brunswick election of 1866 – the 
pivotal one, on which the immediate success of Confederation 
depended. He recounts the family stories – men drilling in the 
moonlight to protect themselves from loyalist attacks, the night 
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riders who showed up at the family farmhouse, looking for Ton-
er’s grand-uncle, beating up the father, giving the mother fifteen 
minutes to get out, burning the place down. On election day, he 
continues, the militia were out in force, to intimidate any Cath-
olic who might have attempted to vote. He speaks as if all this 
happened just yesterday. It was the most anti-Irish Catholic elec-
tion in New Brunswick’s history, he says, slamming his whiskey 
on the counter, and it worked. By tarring Irish Catholics with 
the brush of Fenianism, and by playing up the Fenian scare, the 
Confederates carried the day. He agrees with Robert Dallison 
that the Fenian invasion attempt brought New Brunswick into 
Confederation, but there the agreement stops. The Maritimes, 
he says, have been paying for it ever since. He’ll be damned if he 
celebrates the 150th this coming First of July.
Creighton rounds on him. The Anti-Confederate government in 
New Brunswick, he says, was an unstable compound of those 
who opposed Confederation because it concentrated too much 
power in a central government, and those who opposed it because 
it did not concentrate enough power in a central government. 
Among the former was Timothy Warren Anglin, the leading 
voice of Irish Catholic opposition to Confederation; among the 
latter was his fellow cabinet minister Robert Wilmot. During the 
winter of 1865-66, both men resigned from the government, and 
Wilmot converted to federalism. The premier himself, Albert 
Smith, was wavering on the issue, and the Lieutenant Governor 
Arthur Gordon had been convinced since November 1865 that 
he could buy a union majority in the legislature. The government 
would have lost the election, even if the New York Fenians had 
never gone anywhere near New Brunswick. Haven’t you read 
my Road to Confederation? he asks, his voice rising. It’s all there: 
“Fenianism would unquestionably injure the Anti-Confederate 
cause; but it could not deal it a mortal blow. The movement’s 
chief disability was caused, not by any external force, but by its 
own inward deterioration – by the doubts, uncertainties, and 
contradictions that distracted and inhibited it.”
Toner looks at the whole row of glasses along the bar. We differ, he 
says, on which ones are half empty and half full, but you’ve got it 
ass backwards. Yes, I’ve read your damned book, and yes, all those 
things played a part, but the Fenian raid was the fatal blow to the 
Anti position. The tension is unbearable. I escape to the washroom, 
mulling it over. This time, I think that Creighton has the better of 
the argument, but who knows? The fact is that the Fenians did 
threaten New Brunswick, and that the loyalty card was played and 
played hard during the election. And the Anti-Confederates were 
hammered. But is this the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy? Or an 
instance of historical analysis assuming that because something 
actually happened in a certain way, it had to happen that way, and 
implicitly ruling out contingency? Time to leave them fighting it 
out at the bar of history, knowing that neither will concede ground 
to the other, and that this can never be resolved.
The charge of the Fenians under Colonel O’Neill at the Battle 
of Ridgeway, near Niagara, Ontario, on 2 June 1866. 
Courtesy Library and Archives Canada C-18737.
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On the question of the battle of Ridgeway, the issue is clearer. By 
the time John O’Neill and his thousand men crossed over from 
Black Rock and clobbered the Queen’s Own Rifles at Ridgeway, 
Confederation was already a done deal as far as the United Prov-
ince of Canada was concerned. True, as C.P. Stacey pointed out, 
the raid did heighten a sense of national feeling in Canada, and 
made it even more difficult for the Anti-Confederates to push 
back. But that’s about as far as you can go – and that’s not, in 
truth, very far at all.
So … when we consider the effect of revolutionary Irish nation-
alism, in its Fenian form, on Canadian Confederation, the 
verdict is mixed. It doubtless helped the Confederates in New 
Brunswick, but it’s entirely possible that the colony would have 
elected a pro-Confederate government even if the Fenian leaders 
had decided to stay at home instead. And the argument that the 
Ridgeway raid contributed to Confederation doesn’t hold much 
water, as far as I can see.
***
But there’s another, less visible Irish influence on Confederation 
that needs to be considered – that of constitutional Irish nation-
alism, in the tradition of Daniel O’Connell and the moderate 
wing of the Young Ireland movement. For Irish revolutionary 
nationalists, the republican government of the United States was 
the model, at least in theory. For Irish constitutional national-
ists, on the other hand, there was a natural affinity between their 
aspirations and Canadian realities. Irish reformers had been at 
the forefront of the campaign for responsible government in 
Canada, going back to the days of Robert Thorpe and William 
Weekes. As Robert Fraser points out in his biography of William 
Warren Baldwin in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Bald-
win drew on “Irish models for the question of the sovereignty of 
colonial legislatures.” And the Dictionary of Canadian Biogra-
phy, as you know, is never wrong.
But the most interesting and important figure in this respect 
is Thomas D’Arcy McGee, whose vision of the “new national-
ity” for Canada applied and adapted his earlier Young Ireland 
nationalism – at least in its moderate, pre-French revolution-
ary iteration – to British North America. Legislative autonomy 
within the British Empire, plural-
ism and minority rights, cultural 
and economic nationalism, railway 
development, and a strong sense of 
destiny – all had been central com-
ponents of both his early Irish and 
his later Canadian views. McGee 
was not a major player at the Char-
lottetown and Quebec conferences, 
and his admirers have elevated his 
contribution to Canadian Confed-
eration, in the best “how the Irish saved civilization” tradition. 
But he was important, nonetheless. McGee expressed the case 
for Confederation in memorable, poetic language that none of 
his political contemporaries could match – drawing, by the way, 
partly on Irish oratorical models. He did more than any other 
Canadian politician to publicize the cause of Confederation in 
the Maritimes. And he also helped to ensure that the separate 
school legislation for Catholics in Canada West was carried 
over into Confederation – a point of particular pride for him. 
“So far as I know,” he later said, “this is the first Constitution 
ever given to a mixed people, in 
which the conscientious rights of 
the minority, are made the subject 
of formal guarantee. I shall never 
cease to remember with pleasure 
that I was the first proposer of that 
guarantee in the Quebec Confer-
ence; a guarantee by which we have 
carried the principle of equal and 
reciprocal toleration a step further 
in Canada, than it has yet been car-
ried in any other free government 
– American or European.”
So, what I’m suggesting is a mildly subversive revision of the 
relationship between Irish nationalism and Canadian Confed-
eration, away from the sturm und drang of the bold Fenian men 
versus the heroes of Ridgeway, and towards something quieter 
and less obvious, but perhaps more influential – the transmis-
sion and transmutation of Irish constitutional nationalism into 
British North America, and the possibility that moderate Young 
Irelanders played a greater role in the making of Canada than 
did militant Fenians. That argument will never make it into the 
high schools, let alone a TV series on Canadian history. But 
there just might be something in it.
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(above, from top) Thomas Davis, chief organiser and poet of the 
Young Ireland movement, and Daniel O’Connell. Public Domain.
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